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ESSAY
Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law
Lawrence Joseph*
I. INTRODUCTION
I write poetry." Also, since 1976, when I was admitted to practice
before a state bar, I have served as a law clerk for a justice of a state
supreme court,2 practiced, and mostly taught law. About the time that I
began law school, while I was writing poems that would appear in my
first book, an extraordinary change in jurisprudence began to occur, one
which focused on legal language as something more than a medium for
conveying singular meaning. This legal theory has become as important
as any since legal realism. Because I also have written essays and re-
views about literary and social issues,' I've followed it with wonder. Be-
* Professor of Law, St. John's University. B.A., 1970, University of Michigan; B.A., 1972,
Cambridge University; J.D., 1975, University of Michigan; M.A., 1976, Cambridge University.
Parts of this essay were developed in papers delivered at the Harvard Law School in fall, 1987, and
at the University of Michigan Law School in fall, 1991, while I was a visiting scholar there. My
special thanks to Thomas Grey for his encouragement and help and to Cristina Chou for her edito-
rial attention.
1. My books of poems are Before Our Eyes (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993), Curriculum
Vitae (U. of Pittsburgh, 1988), and Shouting At No One (U. of Pittsburgh, 1983).
2. I have written a memoir about my clerkship experience, and about Justice (later Chief
Justice) G. Mennen Williams of the Michigan Supreme Court for whom I clerked, for an issue of
the University of Detroit Law Review dedicated to Justice Williams' memory. See Justice G. Men-
nen Williams: A Memoir, 66 U. Detroit L. Rev. 339 (1989).
3. Some of my recent essays and reviews include The Morning of the Poem, 32 Poetry East
157 (1992) (an essay on James Schuyler's poetry); The Real Thing, 254 The Nation 531 (1992)
(reviewing John Ashbery's book of poems, Flow Chart (Alfred Knopf, 1991), and Adrienne Rich's
book of poems, An Atlas of the Difficult World (W.W. Norton, 1991)); Union Dues, 253 The Na-
tion 306 (1991) (reviewing Thomas Geoghegan's book on labor unions, Which Side Are You On?:
Trying to Be for Labor When It's Flat on Its Back (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1991)); War After-
thoughts, Hungry Mind Review 27 (Summer 1991) (an essay on the Gulf War); Can't Forget the
Motor City, 251 The Nation 774 (1990) (an essay on Detroit, and review of Ze'ev Chafets's book on
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cause I consider poetry to be, in part, an expression of a theory of
language and meaning, and, as a lawyer, I look at legal texts as a
profound source of political morality and economy, I've read it with
scrutiny.
The difference between a literary and a legal text is fundamental.
Legal texts include a language of wealth distribution, of rights, of
whether to incarcerate or kill those who commit crimes. They result
from, and in, socially institutionalized power. Literary texts, at most,
express it. But law involves language. Legal texts must be interpreted.
Theoretical intersections of language, interpretation, and meaning have
become an integral part not only of twentieth century poetics, but of
jurisprudence as well.
My first objective in this essay is to present certain theories of po-
etry that have developed this century as part of "modernism." In the
introduction to The Necessary Angel, his Essays on Reality and the
Imagination, Wallace Stevens (a modernist poet who doubled as a
surety bond lawyer) said: "One function of the poet at any time is to
discover by his [or her] own thought and feeling what seems . . . to be
poetry at that time."4 My focus will be on what poetry has to say about
language at the end of the modernist century.
I then will talk about certain theories of law. My emphasis will be
on those theories that involve the way lawyers think about language
and meaning. In a practical context, I will explore these theories by
analyzing opinions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey, the United States Supreme Court's recent landmark deci-
sion on a woman's constitutional right to choose to terminate a
pregnancy.5 I hope to show that much of the jurisprudential conflict
and confusion about legal texts these days-even at the level of the Su-
preme Court-can be seen more clearly if juxtaposed against certain
notions of poetic modernism.
I realize that my undertaking sounds ambitious. My hopes, how-
ever, are modest. The theoretical literature about law and language is
Detroit, Devil's Night: And Other True Tales of Detroit (Random House, 1990)); Men of Irony,
The Village Voice 78 (Mar. 20, 1990) (reviewing Tony Harrison's book of poems, V. and Other
Poems (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), and Michael Hofmann's book of poems, K.S. In Lakeland:
New and Selected Poems (Ecco, 1990)); Poetry and Audience, Hungry Mind Review 21 (Sept.
1989) (an essay on modernist poetry); Against Joie de Vivre, Boston Review 26 (Oct. 1989) (re-
viewing Phillip Lopate's book of essays, Against Joie de Vivre (Poseidon, 1989)).
4. Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination vii (Ran-
dom House, 1951). Stevens adds: "Ordinarily [the poet] will disclose what he finds in his own
poetry by way of the poetry itself. He exercises this function most often without being conscious of
it, so that the disclosures in his poetry, while they define what seems to him to be poetry, are
disclosures of poetry, not disclosures of definitions of poetry." Id.
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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vast, and writings about modernist poetics, even if limited to those that
center on language and meaning, are endless. My observations are no
more than that. A reader may imagine other kinds of theoretical talk
about poetry, language, and law. I can too. But this is an essay.' My
intention is to stay as close as I can to those complex points at which
theories of poetry and theories of law intersect to tell us something
about language and meaning. By looking at what poetry says about lan-
guage, I hope to disclose what one of our society's most vital languages,
the language of law, means at this time. The consequences involved are
not esoteric. In this society, law affects everybody, everything. To para-
phrase another modernist poet, the late Italian Nobel Laureate Eugenio
Montale, law, too, must figure out what to do now that a language time
bomb, set over a hundred years ago, has exploded.7
II. THEORIES OF POETRY
Raymond Williams-in one of his last public lectures-took on the
difficult task of defining modernism by asking when it "was." 8 As a clas-
sification for a whole cultural movement and moment, modernism did
not appear until the 1950s; until then, the meaning of "modern" in
literature was roughly the same as "contemporary."9 Modernism is a
critical construct, loaded with different notions. Modernist writers "are
applauded for their denaturalizing of language, their break with the al-
legedly prior view that language is either a clear, transparent glass or a
mirror, and for their making abruptly apparent in the texture of narra-
tive the problematic status of the author and his authority."' 10 As the
author appears in the text, "[t]he self-reflexive text assumes the
cent[er] of the public and aesthetic stage, and in doing so declaratively
repudiates the fixed forms."" Modernism rejects the unquestioned pre-
mise of early and mid-nineteenth century romantic and realist writing
that language is a transparent medium of authentic and authoritative
truth-telling expression.2 After modernism, "art is itself dragged into
6. Because of the essay form, I have tried to resist the lawyer's temptation to cite other
sources to comment on, explain, or justify every perception. The risk of not doing so is academic.
7. See Eugenio Montale, Poet in Our Time 70, 71 (Urizen, 1976).
8. Raymond Williams, When Was Modernism?, 175 New Left Rev. 48 (1989).
9. Id. at 48.
10. Id. at 49.
11. Id.
12. Williams argues, and I agree, that "[a]ny explanation of these changes and their ideologi-
cal consequences must start from the fact that the late nineteenth century was the occasion for the
greatest changes ever seen in the media of cultural production." Id. at 50. Charles Taylor makes
the same observation. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self 456, 457 (Harvard U., 1989). So does
Stephen Kern. See Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 21-23, 72-81, 160-64
(Harvard U., 1983). When a society's media of cultural production changes, the ways in which
artists think about and perceive art also must change-with equal intensity.
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the process of alienation that separates subject and object."13 In the
context of a crisis first imagined by Nietzsche,14 the romantic writer's
belief in the self's power to shape reality through language, and the re-
alist's sense of language as an accurate expression of factitious reality,
are shattered. Something fundamentally new and complicated happens
between subjective and objective expression: the subject loses its au-
thority over the text, the text appears as an aesthetic object, while
meaning exists in between.
Charles Taylor, in different terms, realizes a similar conclusion.
Modernist writing differs from nineteenth century romanticism and re-
alism in two substantial ways. First, modernist art turns more inward,
tending to explore, even to celebrate, subjectivity: "[I]t has explored
new recesses of feeling, entered the stream of consciousness, spawned
schools of art rightly called 'expressionist.' ",s Yet, at the same time,
modernist art "at its greatest ... has often involved a decent[e]ring of
the subject," displacing "the cent[er] of interest onto language, or onto
poetic transmutation itself, or even dissolving the self as usually con-
ceived in favo[r] of some new constellation."'" The paradox, aestheti-
cally, is this: Although the subject is dissolved into the text's
language-into the formal process itself, onto a new and separate aes-
thetic plane-modernism does not eliminate subjectivity. The modern-
ist self is partly constituted by language. Subjectivity does not exist on
the surface of mirror-like language, but in the recesses of meaning ex-
pressed by new forms. Language assumes an objectivity different from
unquestioned objective authorial expression. The text in part becomes
an object by which, and in which, the self is defined. Expressions of,
and about, the self in language can be looked at separately. Though the
self still exists, he or she no longer has complete authority over the
work's language.
A.
Theories of language appear throughout modernist poetics. For ex-
ample, as Sigurd Burckhardt notes in his profound and perceptive es-
say, "The Poet as Fool and Priest," "[t]he first purpose of poetic
Williams's analysis of modernism implies that "post" modernism, as a construct, is defined by
a further critical awareness of the critical existence of modernism. I agree.
13. Peter Burger, Aporias of Modern Aesthetics, 184 New Left Rev. 47, 50 (1990).
14. See id.




language .. . is the very opposite of making language more transpar-
ent. ' 17 If a language pure enough to transmit human experience without
distortion existed, there would be no need for poetry. But not only does
such a language not exist, it cannot; language, by its very nature as a
social instrument, must be a convention, arbitrarily ordering the chaos
of experiences, denying expression to some, allowing it to others.18 Lan-
guage must provide common denominators; so, it necessarily falsifies.
These falsifications are more dangerous the more transparent language
becomes-the more unquestioningly it is accepted as an undistorting
medium.1 9 "[Language] is not windowglass, but rather a system of
lenses which focus and refract the rays of an hypothetical... vision. '20
By the early 1920s, poets (always the most astute critics of their
art) already recognized the complicated refraction of the self in a poem.
"[P]oetry: new form dealt with as a reality in itself," William Carlos
Williams wrote in Spring and All in 1923;21 "poetry has to do with the
dynamization of emotion into a separate form. '22 Yet the self is never
completely decentered. Burckhardt puts it well: "To attain the position
of creative sovereignty over matter, the poet must first of all reduce
language to something resembling a material. [But he or she] can never
do so completely, only proximately. ' '23 The poet "would be much safer
if he [or she] did not commit himself [or herself] to the Word, but in
ironic detachment exploited the infinite ambiguities of speech. ' '24 But,
as Michael Hamburger accurately points out, "[1]anguage itself guaran-
tees that no poetry will be totally 'dehumanized,' regardless whether a
poet attempts to project pure inwardness outwards ... or to lose and
find [herself or] himself in animals, plants and inanimate things. '2 5
Words can never be totally severed from the ideas and meanings that
exist in external reality; "one [does not] need to be a Marxist to recog-
nize that all poetry has political, social and moral implications, regard-
less whether the intention behind it is didactic and 'activist' or not. '2 6




21. William Carlos Williams, in 1 The Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams, 1909-
1939 219 (New Directions, 1986).
22. Id.
23. See Burckhardt, The Poet as Fool and Priest at 280 (cited in note 17).
24. Id. at 297.
25. Michael Hamburger, The Truth of Poetry 31 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969).
26. Id. at 38.
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Take, for example, Marianne Moore's poem,
WHEN I BUY PICTURES
or what is closer to the truth,
when I look at that of which I may regard myself as the imaginary possessor,
I fix upon what would give me pleasure in my average moments:
the satire upon curiosity in which no more is discernible
than the intensity of the mood;
or quite the opposite-the old thing, the mediaeval decorated hat-box,
in which there are hounds with waists diminishing like the waist of the hour-glass,
and deer and birds and seated people;
it may be no more than a square of parquetry; the literal biography perhaps,
in letters standing well apart upon a parchment-like expanse;
an artichoke in six varieties of blue; the snipe-legged hieroglyphic in three parts;
the silver fence protracting Adam's grave, or Michael taking Adam by the wrist.
Too stern an intellectual emphasis upon this quality or that detracts from one's
enjoyment.
It must not wish to disarm anything; nor may the approved triumph easily be
honoured-
that which is great because something else is small.
It comes to this: of whatever sort it is,
it must be "lit with piercing glances into the life of things";
it must acknowledge the spiritual forces which have made it.
2
7
Note how Moore immediately decenters the poem's self. The simple
opening declaration, "[w]hen I buy pictures," is transformed into a
more complicated statement, "when I look at that of which I may re-
gard myself as the imaginary possessor," which the self sees as "closer
to the truth." This long, dense line-thickened by the dense accentu-
ated jostling of its opening eight monosyllables-enmeshes the "I" in its
language. It also relocates the "I" outside the self, in an aesthetic realm.
Then, in a long and complicated sentence, syntactically refracted by
closures demarcated by a colon, a dash, and a series of semicolons, the
"I" is fixed (in the sense of adjusted?) to the imagined object. The ef-
fect is to make the self doubly removed from the actual act of buying,
in a kind of perceptual reality that is no more "than the intensity of the
mood" or (continuing the process of decentering) "quite the oppo-
site-the old thing," which is first described, and then shifted back
through layers of meaning into subjectivity, "literal biography per-
haps." At this point, the reader already has felt the poem as an imagi-
nary object: the poem has assumed the center of attention and aesthetic
focus, beyond "[t]oo stern an intellectual quality." The imagined ob-
ject-the picture turned into the poem-"must not wish to disarm any-
thing." A poem includes wishes. It must be human. It cannot escape
social or economic realities (those subtextually suggested by buying pic-
27. Marianne Moore, Selected Poems (Macmillan, 1935).
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tures, purchasing imagined enjoyment). It cannot ("perhaps") escape
"literal biography." The poem in which the self chooses to imagine buy-
ing a picture "of whatever sort" has its own necessity. It must see
"'into the life of things.'" Yet it also must "acknowledge" (a word con-
noting objectivity) its subjectivity, "the spiritual forces" which-both
separate and part of it-make the poem what it must be. As William
Carlos Williams said about Moore's poetry: "Moore undertakes in her
work to separate the poetry from the subject entirely-like all the
moderns. In this she has been rarely successful and this is important
.... There is no compromise .... Moore never falls from the place
inhabited by poems. It is hard to give an illustration of this from her
work because it is everywhere.
'2 8
B.
Modernist poetry shows that language does not reflect transparent,
authoritative truth. If language is accepted as an undistorting medium,
it only misleads. Language reflects a self, a subject, which partly exists
in the human and social realities it expresses. Language includes an aes-
thetic plane part of, yet simultaneously apart from, human and social
experience. Christa Wolf has remarked that "[t]he reservoir writers
draw on in their writing is experience, which mediates between objec-
tive reality and the authorial subject .... As Anna Seghers said, 'The
writer is the curious crossing point where object becomes subject and
turns back into object.' -29 "To my mind," Wolf continues in a passage
worth quoting at length,
... [Ilt is much more useftil to look at writing, not as an end product, but as a
process which continuously runs alongside life, helping to shape and interpret it:
writing can be seen as a way of being more intensely involved in the world, as the
concentration and focusing of thought, word and deed.... This mode of writing is
not 'subjectivist,' but 'interventionist.' It does require subjectivity, and a subject
who is prepared to undergo unrelenting exposure-that is easy to say, of course,
but I really do mean as unrelenting as possible-to the material at hand, to accept
the burden of the tensions that inexorably arise, and to be curious about the
changes that both material and the author undergo. The new reality you see is
different from the one you saw before. Suddenly, everything is interconnected and
fluid. Things formerly taken as 'given' start to dissolve, revealing the reified social
relations they contain and no longer that hierarchically arranged social cosmos in
which the human particle travels along the paths pre-ordained by sociology or ide-
ology, or deviates from them. It becomes more and more difficult to say 'I,' and yet
at the same time often imperative to do so.... I can only hope I have made it clear
that this method not only does not dispute the existence of objective reality, but is
precisely an attempt to engage with 'objective reality' in a productive manner.3 0
28. William Carlos Williams, Imaginations 310, 312 (New Directions, 1970).
29. Christa Wolf, The Fourth Dimension: Interviews with Christa Wolf 23-24 (Verso, 1988).
30. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
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An inexorable pressure in language exists between objective and subjec-
tive reality.
Wolf in effect echoes what Walter Benjamin said about modernist
writing in the 1930s. In terms of the political ideologies of his time,
Benjamin realized that fascism sought to aestheticize politics, while
communism attempted to politicize art.31 Benjamin intuited that reality
exists aesthetically and politically. Peter Burger formulates what Benja-
min foresaw and Wolf articulates this way: "Art," he says, "now knows
what it is."'3 2 Although modernism has injected its aesthetic aware-
nesses deep into the public realm, it remains "a project that is in every
respect impossible."3 3 Yet "the individual still attempts [it]. It remains
a mystery for theory that people should still write.... And yet it goes
on regardless. Many stake their lives on it." 4 Because it, too, is part of
the structure of modernist reality, making art constitutes "impossible
gesture[s]," the continuous alienation of subject and object "forever en-
acted and then retraced.
'3 5
This is true for the art of poetry. At the end of the modernist cen-
tury, it knows what it is. At the very least, poetry connotes a theory of
language. It tells us, through constantly enacted, ever-deepening subjec-
tive and objective gestures-by its form and by its substance-how
meaning and knowledge come to be in language.
III. THEORIES OF LAW
A.
, The modernist poets decentered the self's authority-the capacity
of the self to speak with transparent objectivity-into the form and tex-
ture of the poem. The poem's authorial self was reformed. By being
made part of the poem itself, the self became an object of critical and
aesthetic attention.
Unlike pre-modernist poetry, legal language in the late nineteenth
century projected no subjectivity whatsoever. Legal language was not
romantic, but "classical" in the eighteenth century sense of the word. It
was presumed objective, neutral, verifiable.36
31. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations 242 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968).




36. For a critical and historical exposition of notions of objectivity and neutrality in "classi-
cal legal thought," see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford U., 1992) ("Horwitz").
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The first theoreticians to react to this classical sense of legal lan-
guage were the legal realists.17 "That something is radically wrong with
our traditional legal thought-ways has long been recognized," Felix Co-
hen wrote in 1935, in his now-famous Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach:5 "Holmes, Gray, Pound, Brooks Adams,
M.R. Cohen, T.R. Powell, Cook, Oliphant, Moore, Radin, Llewellyn,
Yntema, Frank, and other leaders of modern legal thought in America,
are in fundamental agreement in their disrespect for 'mechanical juris-
prudence,' for legal magic and word-jugglery. ' 3 9 But-although intu-
iting the analogous decentering of objectivity in other disciplines
(mathematics, philosophy, physics)'°-the realists did not recognize, at
least expressly, the problematic status of the author and the author's
authority in legal language. Language, for the realist, was a side issue.
The focus, instead, was on changing the status of legal thought from
objectively based, formalized rules, onto a different doctrinal thought-
plane premised, equally objectively, on "social policy" analysis.41 The
realists did not see that a language of policy also included complicated
subjective dimensions (which their peers, the modernist poets, were ag-
gressively exposing in poems).
By the early 1940s, realism had become mainstream legal
thought;42 by the 1960s, the realist critique had become the American
legal education's primary pedagogical method.43 But, in the early 1970s
(well in the background of the jurisprudential quarrels of the time)44
two books appeared, William Bishin's and Christopher Stone's Law,
Language and Ethics,45 and James Boyd White's The Legal Imagina-
tion,4" which later proved to be the first signs of a transformation in
jurisprudence itself. Both books employ realist methods, exploring, for
example, the uncertainties of constructs such as "fact," "rule," and "is-
37. Id. at 169-92.
38. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L.
Rev. 809, 821 (1935).
39. Id. at 821.
40. Id. at 824-29.
41. See generally Horwitz at 169-246 (cited in note 36). Gary Peller has made similar conclu-
sions in his strong critique of how knowledge and meaning have been viewed historically in Ameri-
can law. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1226-40 (1985).
Peller also analyzes the "constructive" side of realism. Id. at 1259-74.
42. See generally Horwitz at 193-246 (cited in note 36).
43. Realism remains the favored pedagogical method. See Robin West, Relativism, Objectiv-
ity and Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1473, 1491 (1990).
44. See generally Horowitz at 247-68 (cited in note 36).
45. William R. Bishin and Christopher D. Stone, Law, Language and Ethics (Foundation,
1972).
46. James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Little, Brown, 1973).
1993] 1235
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
sue." 47 Each book, in different ways, also requires the reader to remain
on a critical plane, actively examining, through philosophical and liter-
ary texts, notions of authority and meaning.48 White's working thesis, in
fact, is that legal language exists socially between author and reader.
Meaning arises through speech, and speech is communal. Lawyers are
compelled to critique language; they must work in it, not through it.
Through a series of questions, exercises, and interchanges between
readers and writers, The Legal Imagination reveals that legal language,
like any language, must be aware of itself. White posits the alterna-
tive-legal language unaware of its powers-as unreal, contrary to the
liberal, democratic, and civil system he believes in.49
Neither Law, Language and Ethics nor The Legal Imagination
uses modernist critical language. Yet each book is distinctly modernist.
The Legal Imagination, in particular, by creating a method by which
an individual reader injects herself or himself into the act of interpret-
ing a legal text, forces a reconsideration of the meaning of legal lan-
guage in subjective terms-the first place this is actively done in the
history of legal thought.
By the early 1980s-only a decade after the Bishin and Stone and
White books-legal theory had evolved significantly (one might say
even radically) in its criticisms of objectivity. In 1983, for example, two
ambitious and now landmark pieces were published in back-to-back is-
sues of the Harvard Law Review: Roberto Unger's The Critical Legal
Studies Movement,50 and Robert Cover's The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative.1 Over one hundred pages
long, with only one footnote, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
openly attempts to meld form and substance. Unger's critique of objec-
tivist and formalist legal thought, coupled with the juxtaposition of
philosophical, moral, theoretical, and political rhetoric in a dense yet
informal style, give the piece the quality of a modernist essay on legal
thought. A year later, in Passion,2 a book-length essay, Unger's mod-
ernism is even more apparent. One of Passion's expressed concerns is
"a modernist criticism and restatement of the Christian-romantic image
47. See Bishin and Stone, Law, Language and Ethics at 371-402, 413-538. See also White,
The Legal Imagination at 566-727.
48. See Bishin and Stone, Law, Language and Ethics at 403-538. See also White, The Legal
Imagination at 3-342, 623-756.
49. See generally White, The Legal Imagination (cited in note 46). The method pervades
The Legal Imagination.
50. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561
(1983).
51. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
52. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality (Free Press, 1984).
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of man that forms the central tradition of reflection about human na-
ture in the West. '5 3 Written in the first person, frequently addressing a
rhetorical "you" in a direct voice, the book contains no notes. By identi-
fying modernism as "a specific movement of opinion and feeling...
pioneered by the great novelists and poets of the early and mid-twenti-
eth centuries-by writers like Proust, Joyce, and Virginia Woolf, Karl
Kraus and Samuel Beckett, Bely, Kafka, Musil, and C6line, Eliot and
Montale," 54 Unger associates himself directly with the modernist
critique.
Cover's The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative employs a different strategy. Acknowledging James Boyd
White "for the ways in which he has explored the range of meaning-
constituting functions of legal discourse," 55 Cover declares: "No set of
legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning . .. It is the diffuse and unprivileged
character of narrative in a modern world, together with the indispens-
ability of narrative to the quest for meaning, that is a principal focus of
this Foreword."5' Cover connects what a person knows about law with
how he or she talks about it-how narrative functions in a legal text.
Law is "a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a reality to
an imagined alternative-that is, as a connective between two states of
affairs, both of which can be represented in their normative significance
only through the devices of narrative. '57 Cover's use of biblical narra-
tives as examples of imaginative constructs" was, at the time, for a
Harvard Law Review Supreme Court Foreword, astonishing. His focus
on legal language as secondary to narrated meaning forced legal criti-
cism onto an entirely new plane: authorial objectivity is questioned by
showing the subjective side of narrated language itself.59
The critical breakdown of legal language did not occur only in liter-
ary terms. In 1982, a year before the Harvard Law Review pieces, the
Texas Law Review published a stellar symposium entitled "Law and
Literature." 0 Its central question, in James Boyd White's words, was
whether the written materials of the law "have determinable and objec-
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 33. For a critique of the modernist form of Unger's Passion and other Critical
Legal Studies writing, see David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1657 (1986).
55. See Cover, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 6-7 n.11 (cited in note 51).
56. Id. at 4 n.3.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 11-25.
59. Cover's emphasis on narrative and the position of the authorial self in critical jurispru-
dence greatly influenced what has come to be called "storytelling" or "narrative" jurisprudence.
See note 76 and accompanying text.
60. Symposium, Law and Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373-586 (1982).
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tive meanings, or is what we call their 'meaning' in fact created by a
community of interpreters?" 61 The contributors also included Ronald
Dworkin, Stanley Fish, Gerald Graff, Michael Hancher, Sanford Levin-
son, William E. Nelson, and G. Edward White. 2 As William Nelson
pointed out,
[a]ll the authors in this Symposium reject the notion that law can have an objective
meaning that is "reducible to a unitary and completely restatable message" ob-
tained through a "'disinterested,' impersonal approach to legal analysis." Those
who address the matter assume, instead, that meaning is created by a complex and
subjective interaction between the readers and the writers of language.
63
At this point, though,
the writers of the various essays in the Symposium, along with others who have
thought about its central question, divide, one group fearing and the other hoping
that exposure of the myth of objectivity will bring the rule of law crashing down.
As Gerald Graff suggests, the difference between the two groups is one of tactics or
political preference. The former group "would presumably keep the cat in the bag"
and the latter "would let him out," but "both parties here" suppose that there is a
'radical consequence in letting the cat out.'8 '
The most controversial pieces were Stanley Fish's.6 5 One of his gen-
eration's leading literary critics, Fish, in the early '80s, turned his for-
midable critical acumen toward legal texts. Fish argued against what he
called the "institutional optimism" of Ronald Dworkin on the one
hand, and the radical pluralism of Sanford Levinson on the other.6
Fish did not dispute Dworkin's recognition that the authorial objectiv-
ity of legal language involved an individual interpreter's subjective "be-
liefs (or whims or desires). ' 7 Instead, he (in effect) attacked that part
of Dworkin's jurisprudence that neutralizes subjectivity by establishing
political, economic, and moral precepts, arguing that Dworkin was not
sufficiently candid about the communal-as opposed to natural-status
of his doctrinal structures.6 8 In Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision,
Fish criticized Levinson, whose position, he claimed, locked the inter-
preter of a legal text in hopeless subjectivity, unable to decide which of
61. James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 Tex. L.
Rev. 415, 416 (1982).
62. See Symposium, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373-586 (cited in note 60).
63. See William E. Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 447 (1982).
64. Id. at 448.
65. See Stanley Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 495 (1982).
See also Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 Tex.
L. Rev. 551 (1982).
66. See Fish, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 495.
67. Id.
68. This is, admittedly, a simplified summary of Fish's argument against Dworkin in Work-
ing on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature. The entire argument is worth read-
ing. See Fish, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 65).
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many beliefs, including his or her own, is the right one."9 Fish stated his
own position in distinctly relativistic terms:
[B]eyond historical and institutional perspectives there is nothing to know-no
knowledge that is recognizably or apprehensibly human-and that, therefore, far
from impeding the search for truth, the forceful and polemic urging of particular
points of view is the means, and the only means, by which the truth is
established.
7 0
He then attacked what he called James Boyd White's "literary plu-
ralism.17 1 White's position-that an adjudicatory text, like literature,
can never be "completely known" because it constitutes a complex in-
terplay between its authors and readers-attempts to remove adjudica-
tive interpretation from the "narrow concerns of particular times and
places. 7 2 White "manages to do what every pluralist would like to do,
to have it both ways. He acknowledges the unavoidability of temporal
and historical perspectives, but he has access to a body of words that
transcends them. '7 8 The literary pluralist objectifies interpretation by
displacing decentered authorial objectivity onto a literary plane, in
which he "can assert the continual relevance of [the timeless literary]
object to the issues of everyday life while at the same time asserting its
independence from those very same issues.""
Both Dworkin and White felt patronized by Fish's representa-
tions. 5 Yet, regardless of their accuracy, Fish's essays impart at least
this much: by the early 1980s legal analysis had been overcome by
doubts about authorial objectivity. Legal theory no longer could evade
considerations of subjectivity and objectivity in legal texts.
By the mid-1980s, the subjective strand in legal theory found its
fullest expression in legal criticism. In recognition of the subjective side
of language, legal criticism began to see itself, in Robin West's words, as
"utopian," "visionary," or "aesthetic. 71 6 Yet, as West also perceived,
69. See Fish, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 496.
70. Id. at 501.




75. See James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 Mercer L. Rev. 739
(1988). In his essay (one of the most important in the jurisprudential literature that deals with
language), White declares: "A related mistake is to claim that the literary view of law fails to see
that law is about power." Id. at 747. Although his elaboration on the point does not directly men-
tion Fish's attack, it clearly addresses it. Id. at 747-49. Dworkin's response to Fish is direct. See
Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in Pragmatism in Law & Soci-
ety 359-82 (Westview, 1991). His retort (also worth reading in full) begins with the declaration:
"Professor Fish has been (as he might put it) on my case for almost a decade." Id. at 377-82.
76. Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal The-
ory, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 145, 203 (1985). Since 1985, the kind of subjectively based critical writing
described and envisioned by West has continued to be written, as Jane Baron recently observed,
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the subjective, aesthetic language of legal criticism must be distin-
guished from the language required by the lawmaking process:
Legal theorists do not make law: they do not decide cases, vote on bills, or under-
take the representation of clients and hence the furtherance of those clients' inter-
est. Consequently, they have the freedom which institutional responsibility does
not allow; they are a step further removed from history than judges or legislators..
. . They must exercise the freedom that their positions allow; they must acknowl-
edge that legal theory and narrative, unlike politics and law, ultimately are forms of
artistic play.
7 7
This is not to say that judges, legislators, and lawyers do not "also
make methodological and visionary choices," or that they can escape
from referring to their "personal histories when formulating a theory of
human nature and social interaction upon which to ground their
work.17 1 The extent to which personal histories interact with the lan-
guage of lawmaking defines still another side of the subjective and ob-
jective split in legal language:
[T]here is an important difference between the legal theorist and the legal actor:
judges, legislators, and lawyers, if acting responsibly, keep these narrative instincts
separate from the act of lawmaking, or at least weigh them against other institu-
tional concerns.
79
"from a dizzying variety of directions." See Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in
Law: An Essay Review of Narrative and the Legal Discourse: A Reader in Storytelling and the
Law, 23 Rutgers L. J. 79 (1991).
Sometimes the subject is the personal stories of individuals-law students, law professors, or
litigants. The 'counter-stories' of groups provide the subject of other essays. Still other essays
focus not on any person or group's story, but on narrative technique, famous literary works,
and appellate opinions as works of literature in their own right. The authors of these essays
come to a wide variety of conclusions as to the implications of attention to stories, ranging
from suggestions that such attention will enable us to become better day-to-day practitioners
of law to arguments that through stories we can change the law itself.
Id. at 80 (footnotes omitted). The "breadth and intensity of the legal academy's fascination with
the telling of stories" has been expressed in writings also identified with "critical legal studies,
feminist jurisprudence, law and economics, the new pragmatism, and critical race theory." Id. at 79
(footnotes omitted).
Mary Coombs has referred to this "explosion of writings" as "outsider scholarship." See Mary
I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 683, 684 (1992).
Outsider scholarship is created and defined, in part, by contrast to traditional legal scholar-
ship, which adopts a prescriptive approach, is grounded on normative positions, and is ex-
pressed in judicial discourse. Traditional scholarship assumes that neutrality and objectivity
are achievable goals. The identity of the scholar should thus be irrelevant when assessing the
work.
In contrast, outsider scholarship is characterized by... rejection of abstraction and dis-
passionate "objectivity," and by a preference for narrative and other engaged forms of
discourse.
Id. at 684-85 (footnotes omitted).





At some point, however, the subjective realities stressed by the theorist
become "objectified" by the political and social demands of lawmaking:
issues of interpretation and narration are folded into institutional
realms.
West's observations are crucial. Her analysis reveals how similar, at
bottom, Fish's position is to both Dworkin's and White's. Dworkin and
Fish both agree that a judicial decision is objective, at least in the sense
that it requires subjectively determined institutional perspectives. And,
contrary to Fish's criticism, White never completely frees the literary or
aesthetic side of an adjudicative text from its institutional context:
White's community of interpreters is bound by the same institutional
concerns by which Fish binds his. West is the first theorist to point out
that while legal criticism has entered into subjective realms, theories of
adjudicative law, by necessity, must still take into account how subjec-
tivity and objectivity are accommodated in decisionmaking texts.80
B.
How much has the new jurisprudence affected the decisionmaking
process? We are, not surprisingly, in a state of transition. Expressions
of subjectivity in judicial opinions are non-programmatic; yet justices of
the United States Supreme Court seem to be intuiting the transforma-
tions that have occurred in legal language and meaning. An intensely
important example of the Supreme Court's struggle with the objective
and subjective pressures in judicial language is Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"' the Court's recent decision on a
woman's constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy-one
of the most striking judicial texts in the history of American constitu-
tional law.
Casey opens with the plurality joint opinion co-authored by Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. In its first sentence-"Liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt" 82 -the plurality proclaims
its desire to establish a jurisprudence based on objective foundations.
Authority is suggested, first of all, by style: the opinion's lack of foot-
notes and frequent use of the first person plural create a detached, ob-
jective tone. The opinion introduces its doctrine of due process liberty
by citing Justice Brandeis's 1927 concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Holmes, in Whitney v. California.3 It then quotes extensively from
80. See also Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About
the Law-As-Literature Movement, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 203 (1987).
81. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
82. Id. at 2803.




Justice Harlan's 1961 dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman," in particu-
lar his language that "'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked
out" in terms of specified constitutional protections" but, rather, "a ra-
tional continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ...-8. The
judicial interpretation of liberty "also recognizes, what a reasonable and
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridg-
ment. '8 7 With Harlan's aformalistic language as a baseline, the opinion
notes "[t]he inescapable fact ... that adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution
to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts have always
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of ex-
pression as a simple rule."88 Reasoned judgment, an "inescapable fact"
constrained by social and historical tradition, replaces simple rule for-
mulation. Due process liberty becomes part of "a living thing," an ob-
jective reality bottomed not on formalized rules, but on social
tradition.8 9
The opinion then discusses what "reasonable people" with "inti-
mate views with infinite variations" might think about a woman's life
and liberty when it comes to the "deep" and "personal" character of
her choice to terminate a pregnancy out of conscience and belief.90 The
language is perspectivist-and social:
Abortion is a unique act.... That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in
a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the
human race'been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of
others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State
to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiri-
tual imperatives and her place in society.91
84. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
85. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismis-
sal on jurisdictional grounds)).
86. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismis-
sal on jurisdictional grounds)).
87. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
88. Id. at 2806.
89. Id. (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds)).
90. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
91. Id. at 2807.
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Similar language continues into an entire section used to discuss
two lines of cases of "comparable dimension." One, beginning with
Lochner v. New York,92 was overruled in 1937 by West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish" because, the Casey joint opinion concludes, "[t]he facts
upon which the earlier case had premised a constitutional resolution of
social controversy had proved to be untrue, and history's demonstration
of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of consti-
tutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. ' 94 The other line
of cases, beginning with Plessy v. Fergusson,9 was overruled in 1954 by
Brown v. Board of Education" for essentially the same reasons: "Soci-
ety's understanding of the facts upon which a constitutional ruling was
sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally different from the basis claimed
for the decision in 1896."Il An interpretive principle, grounded on time
and place, and common knowledge about social, moral, and political
facts of life, is formed into doctrine: "In constitutional adjudication as
elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations,
and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to
overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty.
'98
The authors' objective-sounding language of policy, based on
changing social and historical "facts of life," is, in its anti-formalism,
clearly realist. Yet, like the language of realism, it is limited. Reasoned
sensitive judgment cannot be determined with complete objectivity (the
word "sensitive" alone connotes subjectivity). The joint opinion's inter-
spersed rhetoric of changing notions of fundamental law, spoken in an
objective tone, suggests that the Justices either do not see how their
personal perceptions are part of their joint judgment, or choose not to
say so.
Referring to its "feebly supported, post hoc rationalization[s]," 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist derides the joint opinion's half-submerged sub-
jectivity, especially the social and historical interpretations of West
Coast and Brown.100 If by "feebly supported" the Chief Justice means
that the opinion has no purely objective basis for its doctrinal interpre-
tation, he is right. The joint opinion's sense of the jurisprudence under-
lying West Coast and Brown is, in part, an object of collective,
subjective judgment. Yet, with no sense of apparent self-contradiction,
92. 198 U.s. 45 (1905).
93. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
94. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (discussing Lochner and West Coast Hotel).
95. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.).
98. Id.




the Chief Justice-while exposing the joint opinion's subjectiv-
ity-nevertheless assumes his own language is premised on access to
objectiflable knowledge, on some transcendent source beyond social ex-
perience. Listen, for example, to his discussion of the joint opinion's
analysis of Brown:
The rule of Brown is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is
a judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation, no
matter whether the public might come to believe that it was beneficial. On that
ground it stands, and on that ground alone the Court was justified in properly con-
cluding that the Plessy Court had erred.101
The assertion that Brown simply expresses "a judgment that the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation" implies
that the Brown Court's interpretive language was premised on an epis-
temological certitude outside history and society. "The Judicial Branch
derives its legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but from de-
ciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular
branches of Government comport with the Constitution," the Chief
Justice proclaims. 102 But what does it mean for a court to make a deci-
sion according to its "best lights"? Do these "lights" exist apart from
society or a judge's own personal sensibilities? If so, how? Where? The
Chief Justice says "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis ... should be no more
subject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the basic judicial
task."103 But this assumes that "the basic judicial task" is subject to a
knowledge that exists somewhere outside its institutional context. The
Chief Justice urges his readers to "assume instead, as the Court surely
did in both Brown and West Coast Hotel, that the Court's legitimacy is
enhanced by faithful interpretation of the Constitution irrespective of
public opposition." ' But what makes constitutional interpretation
"faithful?" Is the Chief Justice "faithful" to "legitimacy" because he
believes-irrespective of his own views of social and public policy-that
he objectively can interpret constitutional meaning? "Our task is, as al-
ways, to decide only whether the challenged provisions of a law comport
with the United States Constitution.' ' 0 5 But to say that constitutional
adjudication "only" involves deciding whether challenged provisions
comport with the Constitution implies that the inquiry can be answered
objectively and verified institutionally without any subjective input.
On one plane the Chief Justice's reasoning resembles the joint
opinion's. It is grounded on the realist critique that an objectively based




105. Id. at 2873.
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judicial thought process can be interpretively achieved. Yet the Rehn-
quist opinion also, confusedly, implies a pre-realist attitude. It assumes
that constitutional liberty exists in a realm of objectifiable meaning be-
yond social and political concerns.108
Justice Scalia's opinion begins in the first person 10 7 and never
abandons it. "Quite simply," he says in his introduction,
... the issue in this case [is] not whether the power of a woman to abort her
unborn child is a "liberty" in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of
great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a
liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I
reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning
the "concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is
not constitutionally protected-because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution
says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American
society have permitted it to be legally proscribed. 108
The identifiable speaker does not call attention to himself, his sub-
jectivity, or his emotions. Instead, he deflates his speaking self: "I reach
that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views . . . I
reach the conclusion . . .because of two simple facts." The opinion
adopts a tone of complete objectivity. Justice Scalia's language contains
no sense of self-reflection; it presents itself as capable of declaring ob-
jective truths. Note, for example, how the opinion describes the conflict
of liberties presented by Casey. Unlike the opinions of Justice Stevens,
Justice Blackmun, the joint opinion, and the line of decisional cases
back to Roe v. Wade,10 9 Justice Scalia's opinion analyzes a woman's
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy apart from the State's
right to prohibit it. He asserts, instead, that the liberty clash "quite
simply" exists between an "unborn child" and a woman's choice to
overpower an "unborn child." But, although Justice Scalia claims the
liberty issue is bottomed on a simple and factual interpretive founda-
tion, in actuality, his opinion endows the fetus with a liberty right
which, in effect, equates a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy
with murder. From what realm of verifiable knowledge does this "sim-
ple fact" come? Clearly, it originates in Justice Scalia's personal belief
in a fetus's liberty right. The subjective side of his interpretation ut-
terly escapes him. "Roe was plainly wrong," he claims, "even on the
Court's methodology of 'reasoned judgment,' and even more so (of
106. The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist also signed Justice Scalia's opinion exacerbates
this confusion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
107. "My views on this matter are unchanged.... ." Id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 2874.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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course) if the proper criteria of text and tradition are applied." 110 But
who decides the proper criteria of text and tradition? Justice Scalia's
assertion implies that the criteria can be found objectively, and he is
the one who has done so:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed in plain
view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the brightest
(and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than 10 cases up-
holding abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs
submitted in this and other cases, the best the Court can do to explain how it is
that the word "liberty" must be thought to include the right to destroy human
fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judg-
ment and conceal a political choice."'
Yet Justice Scalia's own collection of adjectives, his "simple facts," are,
necessarily, no less decorations of value judgments, or concealments of
political choices, than those of his colleagues.
Justice Scalia's rhetoric is, in fact, riddled with interpretive contra-
diction. First, he openly employs a language of the first person, yet this
language is spoken in completely objective terms. The opinion's first
person language-which includes both non-reflexive subjectivity and
complete objectivity at the same time-projects a strange and dis-
turbing epistemological cast. The rhetorical flourishes are extraordi-
nary. "The Imperial Judiciary lives "112 is one retort. "It is instructive,"
the Justice says,
to compare this Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a
Volk who will be "tested by following," and whose very "belief in themselves" is
mystically bound up in their "understanding" of a Court that "speak[s] before all
others for their constitutional ideals"--with the somewhat more modest role envi-
sioned for these lawyers by the Founders. 18
This kind of philosophical and cultural language certainly is not
typical judicial critique. Yet, for all its purported objectivity, Justice
Scalia's legal, philosophical, and cultural perceptions are his own. It is
Justice Scalia, not Nietzsche 11' nor the Justices who authored the joint
opinion, who appears mystically and ecstatically bound up in a subjec-
tive knowledge of simple, objective facts:
How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on
both sides of this abortion issue, and on various sides of other issues as well) think
110. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2882.
113. Id.
114. Nietzsche's vision included a recognition of the fundamental changes in the understand-
ing of language and meaning that occurred during his time, and the realities that would be un-
leashed by them. See generally Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, David J. Parent, Vds., Friedrich
Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language (Oxford U., 1989).
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that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as though we were
engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social
consensus. The Court would profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact of
this distressing phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause
permeates today's opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies
not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the
Court calls "reasoned judgment,"... which turns out to be nothing but philosophi-
cal predilection and moral intuition.1 "
"Engaged... in ascertaining an objective law"-is that what Jus-
tice Scalia thinks the Court is doing? But, of course, that is not what
the Court interpretively can do. Justice Scalia lambasts the joint opin-
ion as imperious because it fails to acknowledge its subjectivity. Yet he
is unable to fathom, or chooses not to see, that his sense of objective
law is rooted also in predilection, intuition, and personal judgment. (I
imagine Justices Souter, Kennedy, O'Connor, Stevens, and Blackmun
might find Justice Scalia's self-righteous lack of self-reflection-in the
words Justice Scalia uses to describe their judgment-too much to
bear).
Perhaps the most striking opinion in Casey is Justice Blackmun's.
Like Justice Scalia's, the opinion uses a language of intense, transpar-
ent subjectivity (made even sharper, textually, by the fact that Justice
Blackmun authored the majority opinion in Roe).11 Justice Blackmun's
language is dramatically atypical. He immediately projects himself emo-
tionally into Casey's discourse, connecting his opinion with earlier ones
that he authored or signed; explicit references are made to his own feel-
ings and to the feelings of other justices. "Three years ago, in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Serv[ices]," he reminds his readers, "four
Members of this Court appeared poised to 'cast into darkness the hopes
and visions of every woman in this country' who had come to believe
that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to reproductive
choice. ' 117 With unusual directness, he continues:
All that remained between the promise of Roe and the darkness of the plurality
was a single, flickering flame. Decisions since Webster gave little reason to hope
that this flame would cast much light.... But now, just when so many expected
the darkness to fall, the flame has grown bright. I do not underestimate the signifi-
cance of today's joint opinion. Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to
reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before
Webster. And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single
vote necessary to extinguish the light. 8
115. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis in original).
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). See Horwitz at 271 (cited in note 36).
118. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
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"Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'CONNOR,
KENNEDY, and SOUTER is an act of personal courage and constitu-
tional principle": 119 Justice Blackmun's subjectivity is raw. His use of
the darkness and light metaphor, with its religious connotations, im-
plies, without much interpretive interference, that the protections af-
forded and the jurisprudence expressed by Roe are morally and
spiritually good. The almost apocalyptic directive to the reader to
"[m]ake no mistake" about the personal courage of the named Justices
is framed in a language of prophecy, in a voice resembling that of one
who bears witness. The listener is asked to imagine not only the terrible
moral, social, and political pressures placed personally on Justice Black-
mun himself, but also those imposed on Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter.
Although the opinion turns to more objective-sounding realist talk
in its second part, the voice in its third section switches back suddenly
to the personal and direct:
At long last, THE CHIEF JUSTICE... admit[s] it. Gone are the contentions that
the issue need not be (or has not been) considered. There, on the first page, for all
to see, is what was expected: "We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it
can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare
decisis in constitutional cases."... If there is much reason to applaud the advances
made by the joint opinion today, there is far more to fear from THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE'S opinion.
120
The use of the word "fear" in direct relation to the Chief Justice is
intentionally striking. Fear of what? The subjective intensity continues:
"In the CHIEF JUSTICE's world, a woman considering whether to ter-
minate a pregnancy is entitled to no more protection than adulterers,
murderers, and so-called 'sexual deviates.' Given THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE's exclusive reliance on tradition, people using contraceptives
seem the next likely candidate for his list of outcasts. ' 121 Then,
Even more shocking than THE CHIEF JUSTICE's cramped notion of individual
liberty is his complete omission of any discussion of the effects that compelled
childbirth and motherhood have on women's lives. The only expression of concern
with women's health is purely instrumental-for THE CHIEF JUSTICE, only
women's psychological health is a concern, and only to the extent that he assumes
that every woman who decides to have an abortion does so without serious consid-
eration of the moral implications of their decision ... In short, THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE's view of the State's compelling interest in maternal health has less to do
with health than it does with compelling women to be maternal. 122
It is difficult to imagine judicial language more emotionally direct. Pa-
tently romantic, absorbed by subjectivity, Justice Blackmun uses lan-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2853.
121. Id.
122. Id. (emphasis in original).
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guage as a transparent vehicle for the transfer of deep personal feelings.
Justice Blackmun declares that the Chief Justice (and, by implication,
the three Justices who signed his opinion) do not, or cannot, imagine
(as he and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter have, out of "per-
sonal courage") the realities faced by a woman who has to consider ter-
minating a pregnancy. The consequences of their lack of feeling and
imagination are socially, morally, and politically terrifying:
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense, the distance between the
two approaches is short-the distance is but a single vote.
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before
us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds
will be made.
23
Make no mistake: Justice Blackmun openly exposes the real polit-
ics underlying the Court's liberty jurisprudence. The issue is not
whether subjectivity or politics enter into decisionmaking: Justice
Blackmun openly tells the entire body politic they do. The real ques-
tion is which personal political vision must be chosen. Justice Black-
mun makes it perfectly clear that his (and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter's) vision is "worlds apart" from that of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas. Yet, remarka-
bly, although Justice Blackmun discloses the personal and political
realities that inform the decisions in Casey, his opinion includes no self-
awareness of its subjectivity, no self-critique. Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion never confronts how its subjectivity (to use Christa Wolf's phrase)
"runs alongside" the opinion's objectivity.12 4 No attempt is made to an-
alyze the place that candidly personal, subjective responses have, or
might have, in the context of a judicial opinion-especially one as so-
cially, politically, and interpretively important and controversial as
Casey.
What do the opinions in Casey tell us about legal language and
meaning? The joint opinion, and the opinions of Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist, premise their language on different forms of realist objectiv-
ity. Although Justice Blackmun's subjectivity is exceptional, it never
comes to grips with its interpretive implications. Justice Scalia's opin-
ion is also filled with the first person, but his subjectivity differs from
Justice Blackmun's. The Scalia opinion (signed by the Chief Justice
and Justices White and Thomas) uses subjective language to assert
transcendent objective law-a position pre-realist in its expression of
certain, verifiable, neutral doctrine, yet post-realist in its subjectivity.
123. Id. at 2854-55.
124. See Wolf, The Fourth Dimension at 21 (cited in note 29).
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The Justices who signed Justice Scalia's opinion would appear to have
no sense of the self-reflective character of language. Though correctly
pointing out that the five Justices who signed the joint opinion use a
reasoning premised, in part, on real politics, the Scalia opinion, hypo-
critically, assumes that its interpretive position is based on epistemo-
logical certitude beyond subjectivity and politics. Justice Scalia makes a
big deal about the public's disbelief in the authority of the Court. He
says that this "distressing phenomenon" 125 is a result of opinions like
the joint opinion, which are out of touch with the ordinary citizen's
philosophical and moral intuitions. Constitutional adjudication, he as-
serts, merely involves ascertaining objective law. But not only does this
assume an objectivity that does not exist, it also presumes that ordinary
citizens do not have any philosophical or moral sense of a century-old
change in how language determines meaning. As Eugenio Montale ob-
served over twenty years ago: "[T]hose who organize public
life-politicians, administrators, business men" (one can add lawyers
and judges)-
cannot appear with impunity to have ... no opinions.... Nor could matters be
otherwise since language-the vehicle of every opinion-is in a state of crisis....
The philosopher is aware of his [or her] ignorance, but it is essential to prevent the
[person] in the street from discovering the ignorance of the intellectuals.
Can we prevent this? There was a time when we could.., because uneducated
men [and women] were kept outside the realm of thought. Only very few.., were
authorized to think. The bomb of thought was guarded by a handful of specialists
who did not have any interest in setting it off. Today, however, the bomb has ex-
ploded, and even the individual who is completely illiterate suspects that his [or
her] ignorance is as valuable as the most sophisticated doctrine. Consequently, that
collective figure, which is always somewhat hypothetical but which is composed of
real figures and calls itself "the public," has disappeared .... [T]here is simply a
spontaneous convergence of created interests. 12
The myth of completely objective legal language has converged in a
language of subjectively and objectively created interests-whether we
believe it has, or should have.-
C.
The opinions in Casey exemplify what many legal theorists have
known for at least a decade: legal language contains objective and sub-
jective sides, both of which affect how meaning is made and known.
What does this mean for legal theory? First, writings specifically
identified as critical undoubtedly will continue to inquire into, and de-
125. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
126. Montale, Poet in Our Time at 70-71 (cited in note 7).
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velop, different notions and forms of subjectivity.127 Meanwhile, those
theorists who probe how issues of interpretation and meaning reveal
themselves in adjudicative texts will confront a more complicated and
crucial task. The fundamental jurisprudential question at the end of
this century, and in the beginning of the next, will revolve around how
to incorporate subjectivity and objectivity of decisionmaking texts into
a theory of adjudicative law.
128
Some legal theorists-whose work can be loosely defined as part of
a "new" pragmatism-seem to have intuited a way into, or out of, the
problem. 12 9 One of the critical cores of pragmatism is, as Louis Menand
has succinctly stated,
• .what follows from the view that there is nothing external to experience-no
World of Forms, City of God, independent cogito, a priori category, transcendental
Mind, or far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves, but only the mun-
dane business of making our way as best as we can in a universe shot through with
contingency. "All 'homes' are in finite experience," said [William] James; "finite
experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside the flux secures the issue of it."8 0
Pragmatism is at least realist in its rejection of transcendent meaning
and truth: social experience must be taken into account. 131 But in re-
127. See notes 59, 76 and accompanying text. For a recent critique of subjectivity and objec-
tivity, and the effects that subjectivist interpretation might have on legal theory, see James Boyle,
Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 489
(1991).
One scholar-theorist-writer, Patricia Williams, has taken critical legal thought and language
forthrightly into forms of expression beyond those considered unorthodox even in legal scholar-
ship. See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Harvard U., 1991). The essays
that comprise The Alchemy of Race and Rights project a conscious sense of their formal ambition,
which is to try "to create a genre of legal writing to fill the gaps of traditional legal scholarship."
Id. at 7. As Linda Greene has observed about Williams's project:
She uses numerous techniques to hold the reader's attention: stories relating her own and
others' experiences, multidisciplinary analyses, fantasy, allegory, and prose intertwined with
poetry ... In keeping with her central critique of the false objectivity of American law,
Williams reminds us early and often that "[s]ubject position is everything in... [her] analysis
of the law." Abandoning the disembodied "neutral" and "objective" voice of traditional schol-
arship, she injects autobiographical accounts in an attempt to convey the complexity of her
identity and existence.
Linda S. Greene, "Breaking Form," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 909, 909 (1992) (footnotes omitted). The
Alchemy of Race and Rights also has been praised in the critical world beyond legal academia.
See, for example, Henry Louis Gates, Contract Killer, 252 The Nation 776 (1991).
128. This, of course, is a reenactment, after the injection of modernist concepts of language
into legal thinking, of the fundamental jurisprudential problem of incorporating theory into
practice.
129. See generally Pragmatism in Law & Society (Westview, 1991).
130. Louis Menand, The Real John Dewey, The New York Rev. of Books 50, 52 (June 25,
1992).
131. As Morton Horwitz concludes his The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 at
271 (cited in note 36):
Only pragmatism, with its dynamic understanding of the unfolding of principle over time and
its experimental appreciation of the complex interrelationship between law and politics and
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cent years, legal pragmatism has shifted its focus. It now looks-as the
modernist poets do-at language. As Richard Rorty has observed: "Eve-
rybody seems now to be a legal realist. Nobody wants to talk about a
'science of law' any longer. Nobody doubts what Morton White called
'the revolt against formalism' was a real advance, both in legal theory
and in American intellectual life generally. 1 3 2 The new pragmatism is
different because "new pragmatists talk about language instead of expe-
rience or mind or consciousness, as the old pragmatists did."1 " The new
pragmatists recognize the critical quality of language, the constant in-
terplay between subjectivity and objectivity-along with the need to
bring these perceptions into the process of making adjudicative deci-
sions. Issues of legal language and meaning must be probed as com-
pletely as possible. The new pragmatism seems to envision an
adjudicative process in which personal and social perspectives on, and
candor about, meaning and language become part of the practical pro-
cess of making law.134
The theoretical contours of this approach do not yet exist. Its pro-
cedural and substantive expressions, its form and language, have not
yet been determined. But the sense of a legal text as a created object
that includes personal, political, and cultural perspectives is, now, how
our most astute legal critics and legal practitioners think about legal
language and meaning. 3 5 To deny this critical reality falsifies not only
the authority of decisionmaking texts, but the legal system itself.
theory and practice, has stood against the static fundamentalism of traditional American con-
ceptions of principled jurisprudence.
132. Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in Pragmatism
in Law & Society at 89 (cited in note 129).
133. Id. at 91.
134. Among legal theorists who have written on issues of legal language, interpretation, and
meaning, and who either have claimed (or not disclaimed) some degree of identification with prag-
matism, are Lynn Baker, Stanley Fish, Thomas Grey, Allan Hutchinson, Mar Matsuda, Martha
Minow, Richard Posner, Margaret Jane Radin, Richard Rorty, Joseph William Singer, Elizabeth
Spelman, Catherine Wells, and Cornell West.
135. It appears that United States Supreme Court justices also have become more aware of
subjective influences. In the Stanford Law Review's Summer 1992 issue, "A Tribute to Justice
Thurgood Marshall," both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy remark on Justice Marshall's
powers of persuasion as a storyteller during discussions of cases in conference. See Sandra Day
O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217 (1992), and
Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1221 (1992). Justice
O'Connor's and Justice Kennedy's perceptions received front-page newspaper attention. See Linda
Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Justices, N.Y. Times 1 (Oct. 25, 1992). The
comments of Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy-made in a public forum and picked up by
the media-reveal that Justice Marshall's personal experiences, and the ways in which he narrated
them, sometimes influenced their (and, by implication, Justice Marshall's own) decisions. One
might ask why these subjective realities, discussed outside the adjudicative process, were not men-




In the late nineteenth century changes in public media forced cor-
responding changes in the nature of language and meaning. Writers
who intuited these transformations responded by reforming their art.
Language viewed as unmediated expression was rejected. The status of
the author and the author's authority became problematic, a point of
critical inquiry and aesthetic focus.
The construct used to describe these transformations is modern-
ism. But even before modernism took on its own critical reality, poets
began to intuit the aesthetic transposition that had taken place, recog-
nizing the changing role of the author, or the self, in poetry. The com-
plicated process of decentering the authorial self became central to the
act of writing. The continuous and self-conscious blurring of a poem's
subjective and objective dimensions aesthetically represented the cease-
less separation between subject and object both in language and reality,
with radical implications about knowledge and meaning. Modernist po-
etry recognizes that language is never wholly subjective or objective. Al-
though absorbed by the text, the self is never eliminated; language can
never completely exist without personal, human dimensions.
Legal lahguage was not immune to these changes. But legal theory
realized the objectivity and subjectivity of legal language only after con-
siderable resistance. Nineteenth century jurisprudence considered legal
language transparent and objective. Consequently, the first substantial
change in thinking about legal meaning-legal realism-broke down au-
thorial objectivity. Legal language was rooted, instead, in a different ob-
jectivity-historical experience, human affairs, social morality, political
economy. The realists, however, did not break legal language down into
its subjective, side. This critical process did not actively occur in legal
theory until the 1970s, in the work of William Bishin, Christopher
Stone, and James Boyd White. By the early 1980s, legal criticism had
become increasingly aware of its subjective dimensions; by the late '80s,
subjectivity had surfaced fully in legal thought. Meanwhile, a different
awareness emerged in critical writings about adjudicative texts. Robin
West first recognized that the subjectivity inherent in interpreting the
meaning of an adjudicative text conflicts with the institutional necessity
of making a textual decision that ultimately must order rights, liabili-
ties, or, possibly, incarceration or penalty of death. A theory of adjudi-
cative law must consider how subjectivity-in Christa Wolf's
words-"runs alongside" the decisionmaking text.
what kinds of opinions would have been written if the actual effect of first person experience on
the adjudicative process had been made explicit, rather than omitted.
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One conclusion about poetry at the end of the modernist century is
that it reflects-in forms of language more intense and concentrated
than those of other verbal arts-what language and meaning are. Poetry
connotes a theory of language.
A corresponding conclusion can be made about law. Legal theorists
have come to know the boundaries of legal language, both critical and
adjudicative. This knowledge, I think, explains the attraction a new
pragmatism has had for legal writers who confront, or have been con-
fronted by, the subjective and objective sides of legal language. A prag-
matist realizes that adjudicative language must be brought closer to the
realities of language itself. This is not to say that decisionmaking will
then attain true results. We cannot know that. As the Supreme Court's
opinions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey reveal, however, an adjudicative language that fails to take into
account what we have learned about legal language over the past twenty
years is less knowing, less true. Nor can we know what effect, political
or ideological, different forms of subjectivity and objectivity might have
on the social reality necessarily ordered by adjudication. We do know,
though, that the meaning of legal language-like the language of po-
etry-is something many stake their lives on. It is the truest resem-
blance between poetry and law.
[Vol. 46:12271254
